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CONNECTING THE DOTS: QUALITY, 
ANTITRUST, AND MEDICINE  
Theodosia Stavroulaki1* 
 
Antitrust applies to healthcare. Questioning the wisdom of 
this universal truth, medical professionals actively insisted and 
still insist on professional discretion, self-regulations and other 
practices that violate the antitrust laws. What do medical 
professionals aim to achieve by resisting the application of 
antitrust into their profession? What do antitrust enforcers aim to 
achieve by applying antitrust law to the medical profession? The 
answer is simple. Among others, both antitrust enforcers and 
medical professionals aim to ensure quality. Interestingly, albeit 
their goal is identical, their approach is different. Why? This 
essay explores this enigma by analyzing some seminal healthcare 
antitrust cases. It concludes that the U.S. antitrust enforcers by 
remaining faithful to the narrative that, the more the available 
choices, the better the quality, miss a crucial point: that the 
quality of medical treatment also depends on non-economic 
values such as the notions of safety and trust, essential features of 
the therapeutic enterprise. This essay proposes that the antitrust 
enforcers should extend the notion of healthcare quality when 
they apply antitrust law in the healthcare sector so that this 
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notion encompasses the multiple facets of healthcare quality and 
the ethical values the doctor - patient relationship crucially 
depends on. Adopting an alternative, less myopic, approach 
would allow the antitrust enforcers to create an analytical 
framework under which the multiple dimensions of healthcare 
quality could be balanced against harm to competition. More 
importantly, it would ensure that antitrust enforcers and medical 
associations do not continuously struggle to impose their own 
views on what the prevailing facets of healthcare quality should 
be. In Donabedian’s language, an alternative approach would 
ensure that all functions of the health system commit to the 
quality goals that the system as a whole pursues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts and law makers once believed that healthcare 
markets should escape antitrust scrutiny.2 The Supreme Court 
                                                          
 2  David A. Hyman et al., Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, 
A REPORT BY THE FED.TRADE COMM’N AND THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1, 33 
(July 2004), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-
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applied the antitrust rules to the activities of the American 
Medical Association (AMA).3 Nonetheless, the Court had not 
specifically decided whether physicians’ activity constituted 
‘trade’ on the basis of the Sherman Act leaving the question of 
whether, and the extent to which, traditional antitrust rules 
applied fully to physicians’ practice unexamined.4 In general, it 
was widely believed and accepted that the ‘learned professions’ 
exception applied to the antitrust principles.5 
Nonetheless, following the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,6 the strong belief that the 
‘learned professions’ were not engaged in a commercial activity 
and hence were not subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act was 
rejected.7 The Goldfarb opinion made clear that learned 
professions are not immune from the antitrust rules. The opinion, 
though, did not clarify whether special treatment of the ‘learned 
professions’ under the antitrust laws was totally precluded. In its 
legendary footnote 17, the Court stated: 
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession, as 
distinguished from a business, is, of course, relevant in 
determining whether that particular restraint violates 
the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the 
practice of professions as interchangeable with other 
business activities, and automatically to apply to the 
professions antitrust concepts which originated in other 
areas. The public service aspect, and other features of 
the professions, may require that a particular practice 
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the 
Sherman Act in another context be treated differently. 
We intimate no view on any other situation than the one 
with which we are confronted today.8 
Goldfarb, “marked a crucial watershed in American 
health policy”.9 Before the Court ruled, two underlying ideas 
                                                          
caredose- competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-
justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf.  
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. at n.161. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975). 
 7   BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 587 (West Academic 
Publishing, 7th ed. 2013). 
 8  Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-89. 
 9  Clark C. Havighurst, Healthcare as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust 
Response, 26 DUKE UNIV. J. HEALTH POL’Y & L. 939, 942 (2001). 
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dominated healthcare delivery. First, markets fail in healthcare 
and therefore ordinary market competition is either inappropriate 
or unachievable in this sector.10 Second, the medical profession is 
a self-regulating profession appropriately invested with 
substantial market power in the healthcare sector.11 After the 
Court spoke, however, medical associations were no longer free to 
regulate either themselves or others in ways that restrained 
‘trade’ in the language of the Sherman Act.12 Instead, in the post-
Goldfarb era, physicians were actively prohibited from 
establishing any form of alliance or cooperation that run afoul the 
antitrust principles. In line with this new approach, one year after 
Goldfarb, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,13 the 
Supreme Court underlined that healthcare industry does not 
deserve special treatment and therefore is fully subject to the 
antitrust principles.14 
The application of antitrust law upon healthcare has 
encountered strong resistance from medical professionals. In fact, 
a number of cases in the post-Goldfarb era reveal that medical 
professionals actively insisted on professional discretion, freedom 
from lay interference, self-regulating activities, and other 
practices that inevitably breach the antitrust principles.15 
Essentially, their fear is that antitrust rules and enforcement, 
being tailored to apply to commodities, may disregard the special 
facets and characteristics of the therapeutic enterprise, mainly the 
healthcare quality concern and the medical profession’s self-
regulatory duties.16 
Antitrust scholarship provides several reasons why the 
application of the antitrust rules in the healthcare marketplace 
have not prevented physicians’ from engaging in anticompetitive 
activity. These are mainly under enforcement and lack of 
certainty as to the legal rules governing all forms of physicians’ 
alliances and collaborations.17 Exploring this puzzle again, this 
essay asks: What do medical professionals aim to achieve by 
resisting the application of antitrust into their profession? What 
                                                          
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Arizona v. Maricopa Cty Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982). 
 14  Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 34. 
 15   See FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 586. 
 16  Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Services 
Industry: What Does It All Mean? 58 MILBANK MEM’L FUND QUARTERLY 
89, 92 (1980). 
 17  Thomas L. Greaney, Thirty Years of Solitude: Antitrust Law and 
Physician Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189, 195. (2007). 
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do antitrust enforcers aim to achieve by insisting that antitrust 
law should apply to the medical profession? The answer is 
simple. Among others, both antitrust enforcers and medical 
professionals aim to ensure quality of care. Interestingly, albeit 
their goal is identical, their approach is different? Why? 
Primarily, for two reasons. First, medical professionals 
and antitrust enforcers do not see quality through the same lens. 
While antitrust enforcers remain faithful to the dogma that 
quality will be the result of the economic process, medical 
professionals mainly believe that the medical process and not the 
competitive rivalry will lead to quality improvements.18 From an 
antitrust perspective, quality is considered to be the outcome of 
the competitive process in which consumers enjoy choices and 
producers have incentives to enhance the quality of the products 
and services they offer in order to increase their sales and 
therefore their profits.19 From medical professionals’ perspective, 
“quality is effectively binary[;]” either excellent care is offered to a 
specific individual or it isn’t.20 Additionally, while medical 
professionals consider that health outcomes are improved 
through the attributes of professionalism, such as altruism, 
respect, and the notion of trust in the doctor-patient relationship, 
antitrust authorities mainly believe that vigorous competition and 
not professionalism ensure health improvements. This difference 
in opinion inevitably leads to disagreement on how quality of 
care is improved, with both antitrust enforcers and medical 
professionals supporting their positions in the name of quality.21 
Accommodating plausible professional concerns in a 
competitive market ranks among the most difficult tasks for 
antitrust.22 Surely, some quality claims can easily be condemned 
and judged by antitrust as they amount to nothing more than 
naked restraints to competition. As Robert Pitofsky famously 
noted, quality-of-care justifications “have been advanced to 
support, among other things, broad restraints on almost any form 
of price competition, policies that inhibited the development of 
managed care organizations, and concerted refusals to deal with 
providers or organizations that represented a competitive threat 
                                                          
 18  Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Healthcare Quality and 
the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 556 (2002). 
 19  Thomas E. Kauper, The Role Of Quality Healthcare Consideration In 
Antitrust, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., 273, 293 (1998). 
 20  Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 11. 
 21  See Hammer & Sage, supra note 18, at 557. 
 22  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 587. 
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to physicians.”23 Other claims are obviously more difficult to 
examine and assess. These include claims, that due to the 
healthcare markets’ economic facets, consumers cannot easily 
assess the quality level of the services they receive and, therefore, 
are vulnerable to exploitation by insensitive providers. Arguably, 
such claims often necessitate closer examination by antitrust 
authorities.24 To a certain extent these claims serve a clear 
purpose: they prevent medical professionals from taking 
advantage of their patients’ vulnerability, ignorance, and lack of 
expertise.25 Since opportunistic behavior by physicians harms 
patients’ trust in their physicians and generates anxieties harmful 
to the medical enterprise, there is good reason to consider 
whether a principled basis in competition law for deeming such 
claims compatible with a competitive regime is necessary.26 Is this 
an easy task? Obviously, the answer is a strong no. Nonetheless, 
this is not sufficient to justify antitrust enforcers’ unexamined 
and unconditional rejection of medical associations’ healthcare 
quality claims. 
This essay is structured as follows: First, to set the stage, 
Part I identifies the heart of the conflict. It explains the main 
reasons why medical markets are considered special, and explores 
how medical professionals assess and define quality.  Part II, 
raises the questions that are at the heart of this article. It asks: 
what are the main concerns and justifications medical 
associations and physicians raise with an eye to protect quality? 
How do the antitrust enforcers respond to these claims? Under 
what techniques do they value them? Do they manage to reach 
the appropriate balance between the protection of competition 
and the multiple dimensions of healthcare quality? In unravelling 
Ariadne’s thread, this article analyzes a few seminal antitrust 
cases where healthcare quality claims were actually addressed 
and examined. A short conclusion follows. 
DIVING INTO THE HEART OF THE DEBATE: 
PROFESSIONALISM V. ANTITRUST 
The healthcare policy debate is dominated by different 
ways of thinking about medical treatment—about different 
                                                          
 23  Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 28. 
 24  See Havighurst, supra note 9, at 946. 
 25  Id. at 947. 
 26  Id. 
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paradigms.27 Advocates of the traditional professional paradigm 
insist that market forces do not function well in medical care, and 
therefore medical care should be insulated from market forces, at 
least in certain cases.28 Medical treatment involves technical 
decisions that patients are unable to make.29 Medical 
professionals with specialized knowledge and scientific expertise 
should be entrusted with medical care decision making because of 
the asymmetry information problem—providers can judge the 
quality of the services they offer, consumers cannot.30 
Physicians and medical associations animated by this 
belief often consider themselves the guardians of healthcare 
quality. Inspired by their commitment to professionalism, they 
feel entitled to intervene in the healthcare markets they operate to 
correct the asymmetric distribution of information between 
patients and doctors, and secure quality. These interventions 
usually take the form of ethical norms restricting the forms of 
advertising that can actually take place in a market pervaded by 
information asymmetries,31 standards and certification 
arrangements, price setting for physicians’ fees, and occupational 
licensing and other forms of self-regulation. Inevitably, these 
practices and norms often catch the attention of antitrust law 
which generally assumes that consumers are better off if 
competitor’s independence is preserved. 
To fully understand and assess medical associations’ 
claims that self-regulation may in fact correct the asymmetry of 
information pervading medical markets and ensure quality, one 
should first consider what a free healthcare market would 
actually look like. Proponents of occupational licensing warn that 
a free market may fail to efficiently allocate professional services 
to consumers due to the extremely low quality of services 
provided without licensing.32 The asymmetric distribution of 
information between professionals and consumers as to the 
quality of the services they receive would inevitably cause the 
                                                          
 27  James F. Blumstein, The Application of the Antitrust Doctrine to the 
Healthcare Industry: The Interweaving of Empirical and Normative Issues, 31 
INDIANA L. REV. 1, 91 (1998). 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, 
Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 849, 871 (2000). 
 32  Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels By Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV., 1093, 1115 
(2014). 
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‘lemons problem’:33 if consumers cannot identify and assess 
quality, they may choose to pay only for average quality.34 If 
consumers are unable to recognize superior quality they are 
unwilling to pay a premium; therefore, providers may be 
unwilling to undertake the higher costs the provision of above-
average quality services may entail.35 Ultimately, the quality of 
professional services will be substantially reduced. This would 
result in “deadweight loss”36 in the form of all market transactions 
that did not take place “between high quality providers and high-
quality demanding consumers.”37 Occupational licensing reduces 
this risk by ensuring that only qualified individuals that conform 
to minimum levels of quality can offer their services to 
consumers.38 In antitrust parlance, licensing establishes an entry 
barrier against incompetent and unqualified practitioners. 
Medical markets are also pervaded by negative 
externalities. An individual may choose to purchase low quality 
services for a low price rather than no service at all, only because 
she does not fully internalize the costs of poor service.39 Licensing 
or other means of self-regulation enhance public safety by 
imposing minimum quality standards on professional providers.40 
If the story ended here it would be incomplete. Licensing 
is costly and can therefore lead to an increase in service prices.41 
Some consumers may be deterred from buying professional 
services, namely the services that they would be able to buy in a 
world without licensing.42 Some would-be practitioners would be 
harmed too; these are the non-qualified individuals that would be 
willing to compete with the qualified ones by offering cheaper 
                                                          
 33  Id.; see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON., 488, 489 (1970). 
 34  Marina Lao, Comment: The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints 
Involving Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 499, 513 (2000). 
 35  Id. 
 36  In general “Deadweight loss is the loss of consumer and producer 
surplus when output declines from the competitive to the monopoly level; it is 
the most common measure of the social cost of monopoly.” Richard A. Posner, 
William M. Landes, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 
954 (1980). 
 37  See Edlin & Haw, supra note 32, at 1116. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Edlin & Haw, supra note 32, at 1116 (citing MORRIS M. KLEINER, 
Licensing OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING 
COMPETITION 65-96 (2006)).   
 42  See Edlin & Haw, supra note. 32, at 1114-15. 
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services.43 In sum, self-regulation and professional licensing limit 
the deadweight loss linked with the lemons problem and negative 
externalities but at the same time also result in deadweight loss 
by restraining competition.44 
The remedy, though, should not be worse than the disease. 
Therefore, if competition authorities have to decide whether a 
specific form of self-regulation or professional licensure is pro- or 
anti- competitive, they should be required to weigh harm to 
competition against quality improvements. Do the U.S. antitrust 
enforcers perform this task? And, if yes, how? By examining 
medical associations’ quality claims and justifications in a 
number of seminal healthcare antitrust cases, the following 
section is dedicated to answering these questions. 
FROM GOLDFARB TO TELADOC: HOW DO THE 
U.S. ANTITRUST ENFORCERS AND THE 
COURTS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 
HEALTHCARE QUALITY? 
A. Protecting Healthcare Quality by Excluding Antitrust: Quality 
as Professionalism 
State Boards active in the field of healthcare often invoke 
that their anticompetitive actions aimed at protecting public 
safety and health are immune from antitrust law on the basis of 
the state action doctrine. The latter articulates that “antitrust 
laws do not apply to anticompetitive restraints imposed by the 
States as an act of government”.45 The Supreme Court introduced 
this doctrine in Parker46, after acknowledging that “nothing in the 
language of the Sherman Act or in its history suggests that its 
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from 
activities directed by its legislature”.47 The Court underlined that 
a state cannot “give immunity to those who violate the Sherman 
Act by authorizing them to violate it or by declaring that their 
action is lawful”.48 The Court identified three situations in which 
defendants may claim that they should not be subject to antitrust 
                                                          
 43  Id. at 1115. 
 44  Id. at 1116. 
 45  The N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 366 (4th 
Cir. 2013). 
 46  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 47  The N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 366. 
 48  Id. 
184 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 31:2 
rules as the state action doctrine applies.49 First, if “a state’s own 
actions ‘ipso facto are exempt’ from the antitrust laws”.50 Second, 
when private entities “act on the basis of a clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy and their behavior is 
actively supervised by the State itself”.51 Third, “when 
municipalities or other sub state governmental entities act 
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or 
monopoly public service”.52 
In general, U.S. courts have taken the view that “given the 
fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic 
competition that are embodied in the federal antitrust laws, state 
action immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by 
implication”.53 Thus, they recognize “state action immunity” only 
in cases where it is clear that the anticompetitive behavior under 
scrutiny is undertaken on the basis of regulatory regime that “is 
the State’s own”.54 When examining the state action doctrine in 
healthcare cases, the FTC and the U.S. courts do not seem willing 
to abstain from the Parker doctrine as the courts in North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, South Carolina State 
Board of Dentistry, and Teladoc cases clearly demonstrate. 
In the South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, the FTC 
examined whether the State Board of Dentistry in South Carolina 
breached the antitrust principles by introducing a regulation that 
contravened legislation aiming to facilitate access to dental care 
for poor children in South Carolina.55 In the early 1990s, only a 
limited percentage of Medicaid-eligible children received 
preventive dental care.56 To address this problem, the South 
Carolina legislature amended the applicable framework to allow 
dental hygienists to offer preventive dental care to students.57 The 
amended legislation, however, foresaw that students should be 
examined by a dentist before the hygienist offers them dental 
care. Therefore, access to preventive dental care in schools 
                                                          
 49  Id. 
 50  Id.  
 51  Id. at 367. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id.  
 54  Id. 
 55  South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, Docket No. 9311, 1 (Fed. 
Trade Comm’n Sept. 11, 2007) (opinion and order), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/07/040728commis
sionopinion.pdf.  
 56  Id.  
 57  Id. 
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remained limited.58 In 2000, the state legislature again amended 
its regulatory framework to facilitate the provision of preventive 
dental care in schools.59 Shortly after these amendments took 
place, the Board introduced a new regulation that reinforced the 
pre-examination condition.60 Consequently, even a lower 
percentage of poor children in South Carolina received 
preventive dental care. In 2003, the South Carolina legislature 
amended the law again in order to clarify that the pre-
examination condition did not apply in cases where hygienists 
offered their services in public health settings.61 In response to 
this amendment, the Board reclaimed its initial position that all 
students should be examined by dentist before a hygienist offers 
them services.62 
As expected, the FTC initiated antitrust proceedings 
against the Board.63 In defending the challenged policy, the 
Board asserted that considering its status as a state agency, its 
actions are those of the State and were therefore covered by the 
state action doctrine.64 It further asserted that “it acted pursuant 
to a ‘clearly articulated’ state policy to displace competition”.65 
The FTC rejected this antitrust defense. In unfolding its 
legal thinking, the FTC explained that “where the actor is . . . a 
political subdivision of a state or a private party ostensibly acting 
pursuant to state authorization, the Court has applied a more 
rigorous analysis to determine whether the entity is excluded 
from the federal antitrust laws.” In such cases, the FTC stated, 
“the party is not ipso facto entitled to state action protection; 
rather, the party must demonstrate that it acted pursuant to a 
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to 
displace competition in favor of regulation and that the state 
actively supervised the actions.”66 Such non-governmental entities 
lack the political accountability to shape competition policy.67 
Refusing to treat them as equivalent to the state was therefore in 
line with the state action test.68 The FTC further stressed that 
“[c]ourts have consistently declined to afford ipso facto state 
                                                          
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. at 2. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. at 14. 
 66  Id. at 15.  
 67  Id. at 18. 
 68  Id. 
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action status to state licensing or regulatory boards that are 
composed at least in part of members of the regulated industry”.69 
In this light, the challenged regulation was “in direct conflict with 
the South Carolina statute and inconsistent with the policy ideals 
behind the state action doctrine: that federalism permits the state 
as sovereign to displace the national policy of open competition 
with regulation, only if such anticompetitive intent is clearly 
shown”.70 The FTC concluded, therefore, that the conditions of 
the state action test were not met.71 
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the 
case centered around the strategy of the Board to bar non-dentists 
from offering teeth whitening services in North Carolina.72 In the 
early 1990s, only dentists provided teeth whitening services in 
North Carolina; in 2003, however, non-licensed individuals 
started providing these services at mall kiosks, spas, and retail 
stores.73 The non-dentists’ services differed from dentists’ teeth 
whitening services in certain facets such as the immediacy of the 
results, the ease of use, and price.74 On the other hand, the in-
office teeth whitening services offered by qualified dentists were 
faster, more effective, and did not necessitate repeated sessions.75 
Shortly thereafter, dentists expressed their concerns 
regarding the quality of the services to the Board.76 The Board 
initiated formal proceedings, relying on North Carolina’s Dental 
Practice Act (the Act) to prevent non-dentists from providing 
these services. The Act stated that “it is unlawful for an 
individual to practice dentistry in North Carolina without a 
license from the Board”.77 Although the Board did not have any 
power to prevent non–licensed providers from violating the 
Dental Practice Act,78 they sent numerous cease-and-desist letters 
                                                          
 69  Id. at 18. 
 70  Id. at 27. 
 71  Id. at 27-29.  
 72  North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Docket No 9343, 1 (Fed. 
Trade Comm’n June 4, 2013) (Opinion by Commissioner Rosch), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/12/111207ncdenta
lopinion.pdf.  
 73  Id. 
 74  The N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 364.  
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. 
 78  North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Docket No 9343, 1, 3 (Fed. 
Trade Comm’n Dec. 7, 2011) (Opinion by Commissioner Rosch), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/12/111207ncdenta
lopinion.pdf.  
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to non-dentists providing teeth-whitening services.79 The Board 
also sent letters to mall operators to prevent them from leasing 
kiosk spaces to non–qualified teeth whiteners.80 Undoubtedly, the 
Board’s expelling strategy was successful.81 Non-licensed 
individuals started refraining from offering teeth whitening 
services in North Carolina and producers of teeth whitening 
products used by non-dentists soon exited the market in the 
state.82 
Unsurprisingly, the FTC initiated antitrust proceedings 
against the Board. Alleging that the Board’s actions prevented 
non-dentists from offering teeth whitening services in North 
Carolina and therefore deprived consumers of lower prices and 
choice, the FTC found the challenged conduct anticompetitive.83 
In defending its strategy, the Board alleged that it was 
covered by the state action doctrine.84 To be exempted from the 
antitrust rules, the Board claimed, its conduct should only meet 
the first condition of the state action test, “that the challenged 
restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed as state policy.”85 The Board further claimed that even 
if it was subject to the second condition of the state action 
doctrine, that its activity must be actively supervised by the State, 
North Carolina’s “structural legal oversight of the Board” was 
sufficient to satisfy that condition.86 
The FTC claimed that the Board failed to prove the active 
supervision requirement, and rejected the Board’s defense.87 The 
U.S. antitrust enforcers clarified that the Court always applied 
antitrust law to public-private hybrid entities, such as regulatory 
bodies consisting of market participants.88 If these entities were 
not subject to the active supervision requirement, the FTC 
claimed, they may act according to their own interests rather than 
                                                          
 79  Id. at 1. 
 80  Id. at 5. 
 81  The N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 365 
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the governmental interests of the State.89 Requiring active 
supervision by the state itself in cases where the state agency 
financially benefits from the anticompetitive restraint is in line 
with the policies underlying the state action doctrine.90 The North 
Carolina Board was controlled by licensed dentists in North 
Carolina, thus market participants motivated by their self-
interest that were elected directly by their colleagues.91 
Consequently, the FTC alleged that the defendant could escape 
from the antitrust mandate only in case its conduct was actively 
supervised by the state.92 
Before the Fourth Circuit the defendant again raised the 
state action defense. The Court did not divert from the FTC’s 
legal analysis.93 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower’s court 
decision. It also outlined the conditions under which the active 
supervision condition is generally met.94 First, the Court clarified 
that the supervisor must review the substance of the 
anticompetitive decision and not only the procedure under which 
the decision was adopted.95 Second, the Court clarified that the 
supervisor must not be an active market participant.96 
Concluding that the defendant failed to satisfy the necessary 
conditions of the state action test, the Court rejected this antitrust 
defense.97 
The state action defense was also raised by the Texas 
Medical Board, a state agency “statutorily empowered to regulate 
the practice of medicine in Texas”.98 The latter concerned the 
antitrust proceedings brought by Teladoc, a telemedicine 
company, against the Board over a rule99 that prohibited 
“prescription of any dangerous drug or controlled substance 
without first establishing a defined physician-patient 
relationship”. This mainly included a physical examination that 
should be performed ‘“by either face-to-face visit or in-person 
evaluation’ elsewhere defined as requiring the provider and 
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patient to be in the same physical location or medical site.”100  
Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that the rule in question 
restricted competition by limiting price competition, restricting 
access and by restricting the overall supply of medical services.101 
The Texas Medical Board argued that the challenged rule 
is not subject to the antitrust rules because the state action 
doctrine applied.102 The Board claimed that it was actively 
supervised by the state as its decisions were subject to “judicial 
review by the courts of Texas and the State Office of 
Administrative Hearings as well as review by the Texas 
Legislature”.103 Noting, though, that the judicial review on which 
the Board relied was rather limited, the court alleged that the 
Supreme Court’s state action test was not met104 
B. Quality as a Public Safety Claim 
The Supreme Court initially dealt with quality claims 
related to the learned professions in 1978, when the U.S. initiated 
antitrust proceedings against the National Society of Professional 
Engineers. The plaintiff claimed that the National Society of 
Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics prevented “its members 
from submitting competitive bids for engineering services[,]”105 
and therefore violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.106 Relying 
on footnote 17 of the Goldfarb decision, the defendant claimed 
that its ethical norms served clearly a public safety purpose: they 
minimized the risk “that competition would produce inferior 
engineering work endangering the public safety”.107 The District 
Court rejected this justification without delving into the question 
of whether competition had actually harmed public safety or 
welfare.108 To the Court, this inquiry was not necessary.109 The 
District Court easily dismissed the defendant’s public safety 
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claim, taking the view that “the ban clearly imped[ed] the 
ordinary give and take of the market place and operat[ed] on its 
face [as] tampering with the price structure of engineering fee”.110 
The lower court’s view was affirmed both by the Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court.111 In rejecting the defendant’s 
antitrust defense, the Supreme Court grasped the opportunity to 
clarify to what extent under U.S. antitrust law safety concerns 
can be assessed under the rule of reason.112 The Court stated that 
an antitrust legal analysis can be conducted under two 
complementary categories.113 The first includes agreements, that 
due to their nature and necessary effects, are so obviously 
anticompetitive that they can be found illegal without extensive 
examination of the industry114; these “are per se illegal”.115 The 
second category includes agreements whose effect on competition 
can be evaluated only if the facts peculiar to the business and the 
reasons why the restraint under scrutiny was imposed are 
assessed.116 In both cases, the Court held, the purpose of the 
analysis is to assess the impact of the restraint on competition and 
“not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the 
public interest”.117 
The Court stated that “ethical norms may serve to regulate 
and promote competition in professional services, and thus fall 
within the rule of reason”.118 It underlined that in this particular 
case, the defendant’s quality claim was “a far cry from such a 
position”.119 The Court acknowledged that competition may in 
fact cause some providers to sell a defective product.120 In this 
light, the Court stated “competitive bidding for engineering 
projects may be inherently imprecise and incapable of taking into 
account all the variables that are involved in the actual 
performance of the project”.121 Therefore, 
a purchaser might conclude that his interest in quality—
which may embrace the safety of the end product—
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outweighs the advantages of achieving cost savings by 
pitting one competitor against another. Or an individual 
vendor might independently refrain from price 
negotiation until he has satisfied himself that he fully 
understands the scope of his customers’ needs.122 
The Court admitted that such decisions may make 
sense.123 Such justifications, however, “cannot satisfy the rule of 
reason”.124 
The Court noted an alternative approach would amount 
“to nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the 
Sherman Act”.125 It underlined that the Sherman Act reflects the 
notion that competition will lead not only to lower prices but also 
to higher quality goods and services.126 In rejecting the 
defendant’s defense, the Court contended that “the statutory 
policy precludes inquiry into the question of whether competition 
is good or bad”.127 Therefore, any claim that is based on the 
rationale that competition is too intense cannot be analyzed under 
the rule of reason.128 Adopting a different approach, the Court 
explained, would undoubtedly create the “sea of doubt”.129 
The Supreme Court dealt with analogous quality concerns 
and claims in the seminal case, FTC v. Indiana Federation of 
Dentists.130 The Supreme Court examined the question of 
whether the FTC correctly assessed that “a conspiracy among 
dentists to refuse to submit x-rays to dental insurers for use in 
benefits determinations” constituted an antitrust violation.131 
Since the 1970s, dental health insurers, in response to the 
demands of their policyholders, initiated efforts to suppress the 
cost of dental treatment by “limiting payment of benefits to the 
cost of the least expensive yet adequate treatment suitable to the 
needs of individual patients”.132 In applying such cost-
containment measures, known as “alternative benefits” plans, 
insurers were required to evaluate the diagnosis and 
recommendation of the treating dentist, either in advance or 
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following the dental treatment.133 In carrying out such evaluation, 
insurers often asked dentists to submit, “along with insurance 
claim forms requesting payment of benefits, any dental x-rays 
that had been used by the dentist in examining the patient”.134 
Typically, claim forms and accompanying x-rays were reviewed 
by lay claims examiners who were entitled either to approve 
payment of claims or to refer claims to dental consultants for 
further review.135 The dental consultants may recommend that 
the insurer approve a claim, deny it, or pay only for a less 
expensive course of treatment.136 
Such review of diagnostic and treatment decisions had 
been viewed by some dentists as a threat to their autonomy and 
economic welfare.137 In this context, the Indiana Dental 
Association, a professional association consisting of almost 85% 
of dentists in the State of Indiana, initiated an aggressive effort to 
prevent insurers from implementing alternative benefit plans “by 
enlisting member dentists to pledge not to submit x-rays in 
conjunction with claim forms”.138 The Association’s efforts were 
undoubtedly successful; numerous dentists signed the pledge, and 
insurers operating in Indiana could not easily obtain compliance 
with their requests for x-rays.139 Insurers were forced either to 
adopt more costly methods of making alternative benefits 
determinations or to completely abandon such efforts.140 
The FTC initiated antitrust proceedings against the 
Association.141 In its complaint, the FTC alleged that the 
Association’s strategy amounted to a conspiracy that unlawfully 
restrained trade on the basis of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.142 
“Absent such a restraint[,]” the FTC alleged, “competition among 
dentists for patients would have tended to lead dentists to 
compete with respect to their policies in dealing with patients’ 
insurers”.143 Hence, the FTC claimed that the Association’s policy 
had the actual effect of “eliminating such competition among 
dentists and preventing insurers from obtaining access to x-rays 
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in the desired manner”.144 The FTC held that these findings of 
anticompetitive effect “were sufficient to establish that the 
restraint was unreasonable, even absent proof that the 
Association’s policy had resulted in higher costs to the insurers 
and patients than would have occurred had the x-rays been 
provided”.145 
The defendant raised a public safety defense that, not 
surprisingly, did not alter FTC’s initial assessment. More 
specifically, the FTC rejected the Association’s argument that its 
ethical policy of withholding x-rays “was reasonable because the 
provision of x-rays might lead the insurers to make inaccurate 
determinations of the proper level of care, and thus injure the 
health of the insured patients”.146 They found no evidence that 
use of x-rays by insurers would lead to inferior dental 
treatment.147 
The Seventh Circuit fundamentally diverted from the 
FTC’s findings. Accepting the defendant’s characterization of its 
rule against submission of x-rays as merely an ethical and moral 
policy designed to enhance the welfare of dental patients, it 
concluded that the FTC’s findings were erroneous.148 Applying a 
rule of reason analysis, the court held that by deterring dentists 
from joining together to promote standards of quality that are in 
line with the American Dental Association’s Code of Professional 
Conduct and the Indiana Dental Code, the FTC, “with absolutely 
no expertise” in the field of dentistry, “unwisely regulates the 
dental profession and all of its specialties”, and “to the detriment 
of consumers”.149 Underlining that “the group of dental health 
care insurers should not be permitted to forsake standards of 
quality and proper dental care in an attempt to decrease their 
dental costs”, especially in this case where there were no actual 
proof that the review of dental x-rays had actually decreased the 
costs of care, the Seventh Circuit vacated the FTC’s ruling.150 
Before the Supreme Court, the defendant once again 
raised a public safety defense.151 In line with the FTC’s legal 
analysis, the Supreme Court found that the defendant’s argument 
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was “flawed both legally and factually”.152 Citing National 
Society of Professional Engineers, the Court held that claiming 
that an unrestrained market in which consumers are provided 
with information will lead them to make dangerous or unsafe 
choices amounts to “nothing less than a frontal assault on the 
basic policy of the Sherman Act”.153 The Court insisted that there 
was no reason to believe that the provision of information in the 
dental services market will harm consumers more than in other 
markets.154 The Supreme Court emphasized that the insurers that 
determine the level of care to pay for are not the ones that receive 
the dental services.155 The Court, however, did not assess whether 
this market failure might affect the quality of dental care. 
Adopting the view that “insurers are themselves in competition 
for the patronage of the patients”, the Court easily concluded that 
insurers have the incentives to consider patients’ welfare.156 In 
making this assessment and without providing any essential 
justification, the Court concluded that while insurers always 
behave as their patients’ perfect agents, medical professionals 
behave always as their patients’ imperfect ones. 
Similar patient safety concerns were also raised by the 
Dental Board in North Carolina, where the Board claimed that 
its strategy against non-dentists aimed to protect public health 
and patients’ welfare.157 In brief, the Board held that if non-
dentists were permitted to offer teeth whitening services, the 
quality of these services would be reduced.158 The FTC 
condemned defendant’s quality justification as non-cognizable.159 
“Cognizable is a justification”, the FTC explained, “that stems 
from measures that increase output or improve product quality, 
service or innovation”.160 Alleging, however, that the Courts have 
repeatedly rejected the notion that welfare and public safety 
concerns constitute “cognizable justifications” the FTC dismissed 
the defendant’s quality concerns.161 
                                                          
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. at 463. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Docket No 9343, 1, 24 
(Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 2013) (Opinion by Commissioner Rosch), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/12/111207ncdenta
lopinion.pdf.  
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. at 24-25. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id. 
2019 Connecting the Dots 195 
In defending its policy, the Board also alleged that “a valid 
defense to a Sherman Act claim exists where a state agency 
promotes public health and enforces state’s law even if the 
conditions of the state action doctrine are not met”.162 Adopting, 
once again, the view that “a public safety defense is extraneous to 
an analysis of competitive effects”, the FTC rejected the Board’s 
public safety concerns.163 Before reaching this conclusion though, 
the FTC did not omit to examine the Board’s claim in substance. 
To substantiate its health safety claim, the Board submitted four 
anecdotal reports of harm.164 The FTC held that “four anecdotal 
reports of harm over a multi-year period based on products 
considered safe by the FDA cannot be considered “adequate 
evidence of a potential health or safety risk’”.165 The FTC also 
noted that “although several board members had identified a 
number of theoretical risks from non-dentist teeth whitening, 
none was able to cite any clinical or empirical evidence validating 
any of these concerns.”166 In light of this assessment, the FTC 
found, again, the Board’s claim unsubstantiated. 
The Fourth Circuit fully aligned with the FTC’s legal 
reasoning. Interestingly, Circuit Judge Barbara Milano Keenan, 
who concurred in the majority’s opinion, wrote separately “to 
emphasize the narrow scope of the Appellate Court’s holding that 
the Board is a private actor for the purposes of the state action 
doctrine.”167 Judge Keenan made clear her belief that the Board 
was mainly incentivized by a desire to limit the provision of teeth 
whitening services by non-dentists “under unsanitary 
conditions.”168 She also stressed that (a) the Board “was aware 
that several consumers had suffered from adverse side effects, 
including bleeding or chemically burned gums”, following 
treatment by unqualified individuals;169 (b) several mall kiosks 
where such teeth-whitening services took place did not even have 
access to running water;170 (c) the Board had received several 
reports that non-dentists offered teeth whitening services 
“without using gloves or masks, thereby increasing the risk of 
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adverse side effects.”171 In this light, Judge Keenan admitted that 
the record was in line with the Board’s core quality claim that 
“there is a safety risk inherent in allowing certain individuals who 
are not licensed dentists” to offer teeth whitening services.172 She 
emphasized, however, that only North Carolina “is entitled to 
make the legislative judgment” that the benefits of deterring non-
dentists from performing dental services surpass the harm to 
competition, and not a private consortium.173 
The Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry,174 
the sole licensing authority for optometrists in Massachusetts175 
was also involved in an analogous antitrust dispute. The Board 
enjoyed considerable power because Massachusetts law 
authorized the Board to take disciplinary action against any 
licensee engaged in unprofessional conduct, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation in practice or in advertising.176 Following 
antitrust investigation, the FTC found that the Board restrained 
competition among optometrists in Massachusetts by conspiring 
with its members or others to unreasonably restrict truthful 
advertising by optometrists.177 Among other things, the Board 
prohibited optometrists from (a) advertising discounts from their 
usual prices and fees, (b) permitting optical establishments and 
other commercial practices to truthfully advertise the 
optometrists’ names or professional abilities, and (c) making use 
of truthful advertising that contained testimonials or that is 
“sensational” or “flamboyant”.178 Essentially, the Board 
prohibited all the above irrespective of the truth or falsity of the 
advertisings.179 The Board also prevented retail optical stores 
from informing the public of their lawful affiliation with an 
optometrist and of the availability of the optometrist’s services.180 
In challenging the Board’s policy, the FTC found that the alleged 
advertising restrictions had harmed consumers considerably. In 
fact, because of these restrictions, consumers had been deprived 
of the benefits of vigorous price and service competition among 
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optometrists’ and truthful information about optometrists’ 
services, prices and fees.181 
At trial, the Board did not offer a procompetitive 
justification for its restraints on discount advertising.182 
Essentially, the Board attempted to justify its ban on affiliation 
advertising by supporting the view that its purpose was “to 
reduce the risk of harm to the public from unrestrained 
competition in optometry”.183 More specifically, the Board argued 
that affiliation may actually incentivize optometrists to offer 
lower quality care either because “a lay person may interfere with 
the optometrists’ independent professional judgment, or because 
‘the commercial motivation’ of the optometrist may lessen 
professional standards”.184 In that sense, the advertising 
restriction aimed to prevent consumers from falsely believing that 
they are getting a good offer at a large chain store when in reality 
they only received a lower price for lower quality of eye care.185 
In evaluating these claims, the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) referred to Dr. Kwoka’s study that examined the 
relationship between advertisement restrictions and quality. 186 
Relying on the findings of this study, the ALJ noted that 
“restrictions on advertising in the market for optometrist goods 
and services raise prices and total cost to consumers without 
affecting quality.”187 The ALJ further observed that (a) 
advertising has the effect of decreasing the cost of offering 
optometric goods and services, (b) advertising optometrists offer 
less thorough eye examinations than by the non-advertising ones, 
and (c) in markets where advertising is permitted, 55% of the 
optometrists do not advertise and a higher percentage of all 
optometrists provide higher quality examinations than in markets 
where advertising is banned.188 In examining the Board’s pro-
competition claims under the rule of reason, the ALJ alleged that 
there was no proof that the banned advertising had deceived the 
public and that deception “cannot justify a total ban on truthful 
advertising”.189 Therefore, the Board’s alleged pro-competitive 
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claims were rejected in their entirety.190 
On appeal, the FTC fully approved these findings. 
However, it did so after addressing the issue of the appropriate 
standard for evaluating similar restraints. The Commission 
proposed that such restraints should be examined under the so-
called “structured rule of reason.”191 According to this method of 
analysis, the first question to be asked about any competitive 
restraint is whether it is inherently suspect.192 If not, traditional 
rule of reason applies193, but if so, a second question must be 
examined and answered: is there a plausible efficiency 
justification for the restraint? If not, the restriction can easily be 
found unlawful, but if a plausible efficiency justification exists, 
then a third inquiry is needed: whether the proposed justification 
is valid. If it is proved to be valid, a full rule of reason legal test 
should apply.194 If it is not valid then the restriction is easily 
condemned under the rule of reason.195 This structured legal test 
aimed to serve as the basis for the assessment of competition 
restraints in an era in which the possibility of procompetitive 
restraints was not totally precluded.196 Applying its proposed 
legal test and noting, once again, that defendant’s justifications 
are not cognizable as they are premised on the belief that 
competition itself is inappropriate in optometry, the FTC found 
all the restraints imposed by the Massachusetts Board 
anticompetitive.197 
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In attempting to defend the challenged regulation against 
telemedicine, the Texas Medical Board, in Teladoc, also raised a 
public safety defense. The Board mainly asserted that its revised 
rule198 was necessary for the protection of healthcare quality.199 In 
substantiating its claim the Board cited affidavit testimonies 
presented by medical professionals explaining the limitations and 
weaknesses of a telephone-only diagnosis200 The Board claimed 
these testimonies demonstrated that “there is material risk of 
harm from treatment without any physical examination”.201 The 
Board also questioned Teladoc’s argument that telemedicine 
improves access to patients who cannot easily reach other 
healthcare providers. The Board insisted that the group of 
consumers attracted to Teladoc – “a more affluent and, likely, a 
more technologically savvy group - might have fewer access 
needs than people living in area’s characterized by shortage of 
primary care or socio-economic disadvantage.”202 In this light it 
added that “further research is needed to understand whether 
Teladoc might be improving access for patients with lower 
income and those in rural areas and if not, can it be positioned to 
do so in the future.”203 
The Court was not convinced. Taking the view that 
Teladoc submitted evidence that put into question the Board’s 
claim that its regulation aimed to secure quality and insisting that 
the Supreme Court has ruled that public safety concerns cannot 
justify the adoption by a professional association of an anti-
competitive strategy, the District Court fully dismissed the 
Board’s quality claims.204 
The Board appealed the Court’s decision to a higher 
court. Nonetheless, the Board dropped the appeal due to the 
influx of amicus curie briefs that were filed with the court, most 
of which supported Teladoc’s position. This includes a significant 
brief jointly submitted by the FTC and the Department of Justice 
(the Agencies).205 In this brief, the Agencies asked the Court to 
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ignore the Board’s appeal of Teladoc’s case by insisting that the 
court doesn’t have the authority to review the decision and the 
rule itself should be thrown out.206 
Interestingly, in support of Board’s appeal, the AMA and 
the Texas Medical Association (the Associations) jointly filed a 
brief.207 In the brief they explained why public safety may be 
harmed if the future of telemedicine was left to market forces. 
The Associations acknowledged that telemedicine substantially 
benefits patients, mainly by improving access to healthcare 
services.208 They clarified that telemedicine “is inappropriate for 
certain medical conditions and it carries risks”.209 They claimed 
“[w]ithout the ability to conduct in person physical examinations, 
treating physicians risk misdiagnosing or mistreating patients 
especially through over prescription of antibiotics and other 
medications”.210 In proving their safety claims, the defendants 
relied on research showing that in cases where medical 
professionals cannot conduct physical examination, they may 
either use a conservative approach or propose the use of 
antibiotics in cases where the benefit of antibiotics therapy is 
actually unclear.211 They emphasized that in identifying both 
benefits and risks, medical associations and State medical boards 
across the U.S., cooperate in order to determine how the use of 
telemedicine may “best serve patients and the public”.212 Since 
research demonstrates that allowing the prescription of 
dangerous drugs without requiring in person examination by any 
medical professional may harm the quality of care, some 
regulation aiming to protect public health may in fact be 
necessary, doctors said.213 Such regulation, they held, is precisely 
what the Texas Medical Board undertook with the rules that 
Teladoc challenged.214 As the Board dropped the appeal, 
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unfortunately, their arguments remained unexamined. 
C. Protecting Quality by Correcting the Market Imperfections 
Another way by which medical associations have 
attempted to justify antitrust violations is by spelling out that: as 
doctors they know what is best for their patients’ welfare. They 
have better information regarding what quality of care means 
and how it is achieved. Therefore, it is in their sphere of 
responsibility to fix poorly functioning markets and protect 
people’s health. The FTC and the U.S. courts have thoroughly 
examined this quality argument in two seminal cases: Wilk215 and 
California Dental Association.216 
In Wilk, the legal issue centered around chiropractors’ 
complaints that the AMA conspired to eliminate the chiropractic 
profession by refusing to cooperate with chiropractors.217 
Defendants achieved their goal, plaintiffs argued, by relying on 
former Principle 3 of the AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics, 
which deterred physicians “from associating professionally with 
unscientific practitioners”.218 The plaintiffs asserted that the 
AMA used Principle 3 to eliminate the chiropractic profession by 
characterizing them as “unscientific practitioners”.219 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
defendants’ strategy was a per se violation of Section 1, holding 
that “a canon of medical ethics purporting, surely not frivolously, 
to address the importance of scientific method gives rise to 
questions of sufficient delicacy and novelty at least to escape per 
se treatment.”220 Through a rule of reason analysis the District 
Court took the view that the AMA by applying former Principle 
3, had unreasonably restrained trade in violation of §1 of the 
Sherman Act.221 The court found that the AMA’s main goal was 
“to prevent medical physicians from referring patients to 
chiropractors and from accepting referrals of patients from 
chiropractors, so as to prevent chiropractors from obtaining 
access to hospital diagnostic services and membership on hospital 
medical staffs.”222 The court also found that the AMA aimed “to 
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prevent medical physicians from teaching at chiropractic colleges 
or engaging in any joint research.”223 In sum, AMA’s strategy 
aimed to “prevent any cooperation between the two groups in the 
delivery of health care services.”224 
At trial, the AMA attempted to defend its strategy on the 
basis of the so-called “patient care defense.”225 This defense 
required the AMA to prove that 
(a) It genuinely entertained a concern for what doctors 
perceived as scientific method in the care of each person 
with whom they had entered into a doctor-patient 
relationship; (b) this concern was objectively reasonable; 
(c) this concern had been the dominant motivating 
factor in defendant’s promulgation of Principle 3 and in 
the conduct intended to implement it; (d) this concern 
for scientific method in patient care could not have been 
adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of 
competition.226 
Considering that the AMA failed to meet the defense’s 
second and fourth conditions, the district court easily dismissed 
this antitrust defense.227 
Although the court questioned “the AMA’s genuineness 
regarding its concern for scientific method in patient care”, it 
finally reached the conclusion that the AMA had established the 
first factor.228 In shaping its conclusion, the court considered that 
while the AMA “was attacking chiropractic as unscientific, it 
simultaneously was attacking other unscientific methods of 
disease treatment (e.g., the Krebiozen treatment of cancer), and 
the existence of medical standards or guidelines against 
unscientific practice was relatively common.”229 
The court, however, took the view that the AMA had not 
met the required burden of proof as to the second element of the 
defense, “whether its concern for scientific method in patient care 
was objectively reasonable.”230 To carry out this assessment, the 
court took into account substantial evidence demonstrating that 
chiropractors can treat more effectively than physicians certain 
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medical issues, such as back injuries.231 It also noted that the 
AMA’s members did not seem to examine pro-chiropractic 
arguments with open mind.232 With these elements in mind, the 
court held that: there was no objectively reasonable concern that 
would support a boycott of the entire chiropractic profession.”233 
It also held that the AMA had carried its burden of proof 
in establishing the third element of the defense, “that its concern 
about scientific method was the dominant motivating factor” in 
the challenged conduct.234 The court found that the AMA had not 
met its burden of proving that “its concern for scientific method 
in patient care could not have been satisfied adequately in a 
manner less restrictive of competition.”235 Since the AMA had 
submitted no evidence of other policies less restrictive of 
competition, such as public education, the Court found that the 
AMA had not satisfied the defense’s final condition.236 
The case reached the Seventh Circuit. The Court 
identified “the central question in this case was whether the 
AMA’s boycott constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade 
under §1 of the Sherman Act”.237 A restraint is unreasonable “if it 
falls within the category of restraints held to be per se 
unreasonable, or if it violates what is known as “the rule of 
reason.’”238 Acknowledging that “the Supreme Court historically 
has been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional 
associations as unreasonable per se”, the court examined AMA’s 
challenged boycott under the rule of reason.239 
In brief, the AMA claimed that it should be exempted 
from antitrust liability under the rule of reason as Principle 3 had 
pro-competitive effects.240 The AMA essentially alleged that 
healthcare markets are characterized by information asymmetries 
and therefore patients may be easily deceived by “unscrupulous 
health care providers”. To avoid this risk, consumers may avoid 
necessary treatments.241 In that sense, the AMA’s practice did 
nothing more than protect consumers from unscientific forms of 
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treatment.242 The Seventh Circuit remained skeptical. Expressing 
its belief that the AMA was not wholeheartedly driven by its 
altruistic and scientific concerns, it rejected the defendant’s 
quality justifications.243 In line with the lower court’s view, it 
found AMA’s boycott anti-competitive.244 
California Dental Association v. FTC involved an 
association of dentists with membership of a large percentage of 
all dentists in California.245 The antitrust issue in this case 
concerned Califonria Dental Association’s (CDA) code of ethics, 
including Section 10 of CDA’s professional code which 
prohibited advertising or solicitation “false or misleading in any 
material respect.”246 CDA’s Judicial Council, whose role was to 
enforce CDA’s Code, had issued multiple advisory opinions and 
guidance elaborating upon the scope of this standard.247 These 
opinions, which formed the basis of the FTC’s challenge, argued 
that a statement or claim could be considered false or misleading 
where: 
(a) it contained a misrepresentation of fact; (b) it made 
only a partial disclosure of relevant facts (c) it was likely 
to create false or unjustified expectations of favorable 
results and/or costs (d) it related to fees for specific types 
of services without fully and specifically disclosing all 
variables and (e) it contained other representations or 
implications that in reasonable probability would cause 
an ordinarily prudent person to be deceived.248 
Concerning price advertising, CDA allowed advertising 
discounts only with extensive disclosures.249 CDA’s Code of 
Ethics and all relevant guidelines required that “all price 
advertising be exact and that discount advertising list the regular 
fee for each discounted service, the percentage of the discount, the 
length of time that the discount will be available, verifiable fees, 
and the specific groups who are eligible for the discount.”250 
When applying and enforcing these conditions, CDA often “cited 
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members for using phrases such as low, reasonable or inexpensive 
fees, and for failing to include the regular fees for each service 
covered by across-the-board senior citizen discounts, or coupon 
discounts for new customers”.251 
Additionally, adopting the opinion that non-price claims 
“are not susceptible to measurement or verification” and therefore 
“likely to be false or misleading” in practice CDA prohibited all 
quality claims.252 For example, CDA recommended “denial of 
membership to one dentist because her advertising included the 
phrase quality dentistry which CDA thought was not susceptible 
of verification”.253 Furthermore, although written regulations had 
not been adopted, CDA did not allow “claims of superiority and 
the issuance of guarantees.”254 CDA had considered an 
advertisement including the phrase “we can provide the 
uncompromised standards of excellence you demand’ to be “an 
impermissible representation of superiority.”255 
When examining the anti-competitive effects of CDA’s 
policies and norms, the FTC rejected the Massachusetts Board 
analysis, finding instead that the restrictions on discount 
advertising were illegal per se.256 The FTC took the view that 
CDA’s restrictions on advertising “low” or “reasonable” fees, and 
its extensive disclosure requirements for discount advertising, 
“effectively preclude its members from making low fee or across-
the-board discount claims regardless of their truthfulness.”257 
Noting that the professional context of this restriction cannot 
alter the analysis, as well as that in cases involving agreements 
not “premised on public service or ethical norms, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly applied the per se rule,”258 the FTC stressed 
that a ban that significantly restricts price competition is illegal 
per se.259 Applying an abbreviated analysis, the FTC also 
condemned the non-price advertising restrictions. With regard to 
these restraints, the FTC stated, “we cannot say with equal 
confidence that, as a facial matter, CDA’s concerns are unrelated 
to the public service aspect of its profession, or that the practice 
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facially appears to be one that would always or almost always 
tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”260 Considering, 
however, that CDA had not provided a “convincing argument, let 
alone evidence, that consumers of dental services had been, or 
were likely to be, harmed by the broad categories of advertising 
that it restricted”, the FTC concluded that the non-price 
restrictions were clearly anticompetitive.261 
Taking the view that this case concerned a set of ethical 
norms introduced by a professional organization that aimed to 
prevent false and misleading advertising and that “CDA’s 
policies do not, on their face, ban truthful, non-deceptive ads,” 
the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of per se analysis with regards 
to price advertising restrictions.262 The court refused to accept 
CDA’s procompetitive justifications that its policy encouraged 
disclosure and prevented false and misleading advertising.263 
Since the record “provided no evidence that CDA’s policy has in 
fact led to increased disclosure and transparency of dental 
pricing[,]” such claim, the court noted, carried little weight.264 As 
to the non-price advertising restrictions, the court dismissed 
CDA’s concerns that “claims about quality are inherently 
unverifiable and therefore misleading.”265 Although this danger 
exists, it cannot justify preventing all quality claims and 
irrespective of whether they are false or misleading.266 In light of 
these concerns, the Ninth Circuit fully aligned with the FTC’s 
view that the non-price advertising restriction was nothing more 
than “a naked restraint on output” and therefore no further 
assessment under a rule of reason legal analysis was necessary.267 
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded 
the judgment to the Ninth Circuit for a fuller inquiry into 
whether CDA’s activities violated antitrust laws.268 The Court 
made clear that a quick look analysis should be limited only to 
cases where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding 
of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question 
would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and 
                                                          
 260  Id. at 308.  
 261  Id. at 319.  
 262  Cal. Dental Ass’n, 128 F.3d at 727.  
 263  Id. at 728. 
 264  Id. 
 265  Id. 
 266  Id. 
 267  Id. 
 268  Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999), vacating 128 F.3d at 
727 (9th Cir. 1997). 
2019 Connecting the Dots 207 
markets”.269 Considering the special facets of the professional 
services market, the Supreme Court found that CDA’s practice 
was not one of these cases.270 To the Court, CDA’s restrictions 
aimed to eliminate false or deceptive advertising “in a market 
characterized by striking disparities between the information 
available to the professional and the patient”.271 Examining 
defendant’s restrictions from this perspective, the Court 
concluded that CDA’s restrictions might, instead, be pro-
competitive.272 Citing Akerlof’s famous work ‘The market for 
lemons, Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, the 
Court stated that 
in the market for professional services, in which 
advertising is relatively rare and the comparability of 
service packages not easily established, the difficulty for 
customers or potential competitors to get and verify 
information about the price and availability of services 
can magnify the dangers to competition associated with 
misleading advertising.273 
The Court acknowledged that “the quality of professional 
services tends to resist either calibration or monitoring by 
individual patients or clients”.274 This related to the expertise 
required to evaluate these services and the challenge in 
determining the extent to which “an outcome is attributable to the 
quality of services (like a poor job of tooth-filling) or to something 
else.”275 When examining the market’s special characteristics, the 
Court further recognized that “patients’ attachments to particular 
professionals, the rationality of which is difficult to assess, 
complicate the picture even more.”276 
The Court analyzed CDA’s price advertising restrictions, 
and found that they do not necessarily limit price competition. On 
the contrary, the Court held they may even enhance competition 
“by reducing the occurrence of unverifiable and misleading across 
the board discount advertising.”277 Even if across the board 
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discount advertisements are more effective “in drawing customers 
in the short run, the recurrence of some measure of intentional or 
accidental misstatement, due to the breadth of their claims, might 
leak out over time to make potential clients skeptical of any such 
across the board advertising, so undercutting the method’s 
effectiveness.”278 The Court explained that across the board 
discount advertisements might continue to attract business 
indefinitely but only because they mislead customers.279 In this 
light, their effect may be anti-competitive instead of pro-
competitive.280 The Court stated that CDA’s rules reflected the 
prediction “that any costs to competition associated with the 
elimination of across the board advertising will be out weighted 
by gains to consumer information that is exact, accurate and 
more easily verifiable (at least by regulators).”281 Although this 
view may not necessarily be correct from an economics 
perspective, “neither a Court nor the Commission may initially 
dismiss it as presumptively wrong.”282 
As to the CDA’s non-price advertising restrictions, the 
Court again abstained from adopting the lower court’s 
competition analysis. The Court took the view that the Ninth 
Circuit erred in dismissing the countervailing claim “that 
restricting difficult to verify claims about quality or patient 
comfort would have a precompetitive effect by preventing 
misleading or false claims that distort the market”.283 It 
underlined that “CDA’s restrictions should be assessed 
differently: as nothing more than a procompetitive ban on 
puffery.”284 Following the Supreme Court’s judgment the FTC 
announced its decision not to seek further review in the Supreme 
Court for this case and dismissed the complaint.285 
UNRAVELLING ARIADNE’S THREAD: HOW DO 
THE U.S. ANTITRUST ENFORCERS AND THE 
COURTS BALANCE CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
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DIFFERENT QUALITY PERSPECTIVES? 
A. Identifying the Core of the FTC’s and the U.S. Courts’ 
Approach 
The descriptive analysis of the above seminal cases 
demonstrates that the U.S. courts and the FTC do examine 
healthcare quality arguments in the context of their competition 
assessment. To the FTC and the courts, quality of care matters. 
However, it matters to the same extent it matters in other 
industries, such as airline or automotive. Both the U.S. courts and 
the FTC are straightforward with this point. With the exception 
of the California Dental Association case, the central message 
they constantly transmit when they deal with antitrust violations 
in healthcare markets is that healthcare is not special. 
I argue that there are two main implications of this 
approach. First, both the FTC and the U.S. courts constantly 
take the view that, as in other markets, quality will be the result 
of the competitive process. Quality of care is ensured only to the 
extent choice, vigorous competition and information are ensured. 
Second, when the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the courts are 
required to examine whether a restriction to competition and not 
the maximization of the available choices is necessary for the 
protection of healthcare quality, the answer is primarily no. 
Convinced of the democratic and economics merits of the 
competitive model, they seem unwilling to consider any claim 
implying that market forces may not necessarily function 
properly in this sector.286 Consequently, when the FTC and the 
U.S. courts are forced to accommodate conflicting views between 
antitrust and medicine on what the main attributes of healthcare 
quality are, the bottom line is that antitrust knows better. An 
alternative approach was adopted by the Seventh Circuit  in 
Indiana Federation of Dentists, where the Court held that by 
“preventing dentists from joining together to promote standards 
of quality dental care that comport with the Indiana Dental 
Code, the FTC with no expertise in the field of dentistry unwisely 
regulated the dental profession.”287 By retelling however the story 
that vigorous competition and not collaboration between medical 
professionals improves quality, the Supreme Court chose to 
divert from the Appellate Court’s approach. 
This assessment does not imply that the FTC and the U.S. 
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courts completely disregard medical associations’ quality claims. 
On the opposite, they do examine them. Nonetheless, they allow 
these claims to enter into the equation only to the extent they 
reflect the notion that healthcare markets are pervaded by 
market imperfections that may diminish healthcare quality. 
Indeed, the antitrust enforcers do not seem to preclude the 
possibility that improving the workings of a market characterized 
by market failures might make a restraint less naked.288 This 
conclusion can be easily reached taking into account the Courts’ 
legal analysis in two seminal antitrust cases: Wilk and California 
Dental Association (CDA). 
In the CDA case, Judge Souter, in delivering the opinion 
of the Court, explained how the healthcare market’s special facets 
may affect antitrust analysis when price and non-price 
advertising restrictions are analyzed and assessed. Among other 
things, Judge Souter identified (a) consumers’ challenges in 
verifying price information and assessing the quality of the 
services they receive; (b) the asymmetric distribution of 
information between professionals and patients; (c) the patients’ 
attachment to particular professionals, the rationality of which is 
far from easy to analyze and assess.289 As Judge Souter noted, all 
these characteristics complicate the picture of the professional 
services market and require antitrust enforcers to examine on the 
basis of the rule of reason whether certain restrictions to 
competition, such as advertising restrictions, are in fact 
procompetitive, instead of anticompetitive.290 
The Court’s analysis in California Dental Association is 
illuminating. To begin with, the Court’s analysis leaves no doubt 
that antitrust enforcers should not shut their ears to medical 
associations’ claims that healthcare markets are special. 
California Dental Association has also been characterized as a 
setback for what was considered “the quick look antitrust 
movement”.291 Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically claimed 
that “the Court of Appeals erred when it held as a matter of law 
that quick look analysis was appropriate.”292 Nonetheless, 
although the Court declared that the medical markets’ special 
characteristics necessitate a more vigorous legal analysis, it 
                                                          
 288  Thomas L. Greaney, A Perfect Storm on the Sea of Doubt: Physicians, 
Professionalism and Antitrust, 14 LOY. CONS. L. REV. 481, 484 (2002). 
 289  Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 772-73.  
 290  Id. at 757.  
 291  Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look but 
Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 495, 496 (2000). 
 292  Id. at 532. 
2019 Connecting the Dots 211 
missed the opportunity to clarify: (a) under what conditions the 
healthcare markets’ economic and non-economic facets should be 
examined under the rule of reason analysis, and (b) how antitrust 
enforcers should strike the appropriate balance between 
restrictions to competition and quality improvements. Not 
elaborating on these issues, though, the Supreme Court inevitably 
opened the door to market failure defenses much wider than it 
initially aimed. 
Arguably, information asymmetry will be present – albeit 
in different degrees – in most cases centered around health 
professionals’ activities.293 Unfortunately, trial courts will obtain 
no guidance from California Dental Association as to what extent 
such information deficits may justify a rule of reason analysis or 
when quick look is “meet for the case”.294 Future litigants and 
courts, not knowing just how much proof a reviewing court may 
require to decide that trade under the Sherman Act was 
restrained, may opt for broader, more extensive discovery and 
analysis than may in fact be necessary, increasing the cost and 
therefore the difficulty of successfully challenging professional 
associations’ anti-competitive self-regulatory activities.295 
Surely, this is not the only weakness in the Supreme 
Court’s analysis regarding the information deficits characterizing 
healthcare markets. The Court’s analysis concerning the extent to 
which the challenged advertising restrictions may cure this 
information asymmetry has also caught the attention of the 
antitrust scholarship. As noted, the Supreme Court held that 
informational deficits may impair the functioning of the 
healthcare market and may therefore justify professional 
interventions, without explaining why and how advertising 
restrictions may actually cure such deficits. Since advertising 
seeks to correct market failure by increasing the amount of 
information available to consumers, this, indeed, is “a critical 
lapse”.296 Relying also on the Akerlof’s article to argue that 
“dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the 
market[,]” the Court overreacted as to the extent to which 
information deficits in the healthcare marketplace may diminish 
quality.297 As economists argue, the lemons problem claim 
completely disregards the governmental institutions aiming to 
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protect consumers.298 Indeed, occupational licensing or 
government regulation that limits deceptive or misleading 
advertising can effectively protect consumers from exploitative 
advertising strategies.299 
While the Supreme Court in California Dental Association 
explored why healthcare markets might differ from others, in 
Wilk, the Seventh Circuit focused more on crafting a process 
under the rule of reason for assessing quality claims associated 
with healthcare market’s special facets. Was this attempt 
successful? Considering that there are several reasons to question 
the wisdom of the Seventh Circuit’s “patient care defense[,]”the 
answer is not an easy one.300 
As analyzed, at issue in this case were the AMA’s ethical 
norms that essentially deterred physicians from establishing any 
form of cooperation with chiropractors. Such restrictions, the 
AMA claimed, contributed to the protection of healthcare quality 
and the advancement of scientific knowledge.301 The Seventh 
Circuit responded to this argument with the patient care defense. 
Under this legal test, the defendant was required to prove that its 
strategy was essentially animated by “objectively reasonable” 
concern for issues related to the “scientific method” underlying 
medical treatment; More importantly, the test further required 
the defendant to prove that less restrictive alternatives for 
protecting quality were not available.302 This test, which 
subsequently was never applied by the FTC or the courts, proved 
to be demanding.303 By reformulating the rule of reason, and, by 
requiring defendants to prove both objective and subjective 
elements, this test invited an open-ended inquiry into scientific 
concerns and beliefs that arguably increased the level of challenge 
both for judges and juries.304 How could the defendants prove 
that their concerns about chiropractic profession are based on 
scientific findings considering that scientists, in general, and 
doctors, in particular, constantly disagree on whether a specific 
treatment is scientific? For instance, while some doctors consider 
homeopathy a pseudoscience - a belief that is incorrectly 
presented as scientific—others believe that this alternative form 
of treatment has a positive effect on health outcomes. In addition, 
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how can judges and antitrust enforcers assess whether the 
defendants’ primary incentive in excluding competitors is the 
protection of healthcare quality and not their self-interest? And if 
reality clearly demonstrates that defendants’ exclusionary 
strategies are animated both by their commitment to maintain 
high standards of professionalism and their self-interest, how 
should antitrust enforcers balance such conflicting goals and 
motives? Which incentive should weigh more in their antitrust 
analysis? 
One would also wonder why the Court chose to introduce 
a test that required defendants to prove subjective elements, 
namely their dominant motives and beliefs. This is especially 
striking because in antitrust cases, market characteristics and 
effects, not intentions, shape the legal analysis and outcomes. As 
noted in Wilk, the AMA emphasized that healthcare is burdened 
with information asymmetries that may harm patients’ trust in 
their doctors and that their policy did nothing more than curing 
this market failure. The Court, by formulating its standard in 
terms of purpose, noted it is the physicians’ intentions and 
motives that became crucial305 and not market structures and 
effects. 
More importantly, while the Courts seem to embrace the 
possibility of integrating quality concerns into their analysis in 
the context of a “market failure defense,” they essentially exclude 
any possibility of integrating quality concerns into their 
assessment in the context of a “public safety defense.” The FTC 
and the U.S. courts continuously claim that “[t]he Sherman Act 
reflects a legislative judgment that, ultimately, competition will 
produce not only lower prices but also better goods and 
services.”306 Hence, adopting an alternative approach, one that 
would accept that less choice and competition may be necessary 
for the protection of health care quality, would amount “to 
nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the 
Sherman Act.”307 The U.S. antitrust enforcers and the courts tell 
the same story even when public safety claims are raised by 
medical associations arguing that their challenged strategies are 
in line with their ethical and moral policy to protect the public 
from actions that create risks to public safety and health. Unless 
their initiatives to protect quality meet the narrow conditions of 
the state action doctrine, the courts confidently claim that their 
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patient safety concerns are not induced by their ethical 
responsibilities to protect public safety but by mere opportunism. 
Let us recall North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners where Judge Keenan clarified that “the record 
supported the Board’s argument that there was a safety risk 
inherent in allowing certain individuals, who are not licensed 
dentists, particularly mall kiosk employees, to perform teeth 
whitening services.”308 Judge Keenan did not miss the 
opportunity to admit that she was convinced that the Board’s 
expelling strategy against non-dentists was mainly animated by 
its commitment to “eliminate an unsafe medical practice.”309 This 
essential finding, though, did not alter the court’s antitrust 
narrative. To the antitrust enforcers and the courts, “the statutory 
policy precludes inquiry into the question of whether competition 
is good or bad[,]” and any evaluation as to the risks to healthcare 
quality the available market choices in reality create is just 
unnecessary.310 
B. What are the Main Pros and Cons of the FTC’s and the U.S. 
Courts’ Approach? 
The above analysis revealed that the U.S. antitrust 
enforcers and the courts primarily take into account quality by 
ensuring that competition and choice in the healthcare services 
market is not restricted. The beauty of this legal analysis lies in its 
simplicity. Indeed, it offers a simple solution to a complex 
problem: to ensure quality one must maximize the available 
choices. It also revealed that while the U.S. antitrust enforcers 
and the courts seem less unwilling to evaluate quality claims in 
the context of a market failure defense, they seem clearly less 
willing to assess quality concerns in the context of a public safety 
defense. To them, such justifications are neither cognizable, nor 
plausible. Why do the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the courts 
draw such a strict line between these two types of quality 
justifications? Why do they completely disregard public safety 
claims? And more importantly, would the outcome of their 
analysis necessarily change in case they chose to widen the range 
of the quality justifications they actually consider and accept? 
The answer should be negative. 
In Wilk, the defendants attempted to convince the court 
that the market imperfections burdening healthcare markets 
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justify their expelling strategy against chiropractors. In 
Massachusetts Board, the optometrists argued that their anti-
competitive behavior was primarily fueled by their motivation to 
protect consumers from inferior eye care. In Teladoc, the Texas 
Medical Board alleged that the telemedicine regulation aimed to 
protect patients from inadequate diagnosis and excessive use of 
antibiotics. 
Although the rationale behind all these justifications 
seems to differ, in fact it does not. This is because in all these 
cases the alleged quality claims could be structured either as 
public safety or market failure defenses. In Wilk, for instance, the 
AMA could have argued that chiropractors’ treatment may lead 
to inferior patient care. In Massachusetts Board, the Board, 
alternatively, could have argued that consumers in eye care 
services lack the adequate knowledge to evaluate the quality of 
the services they receive, and thus, the challenged regulation 
ensures that the imperfect market in which the Board’s members 
operate becomes less imperfect. Accordingly, in Teladoc, the 
Texas Medical Board could have alleged that since a medical 
professional treating a patient on a telephone diagnosis only may 
be called upon to act with uncertain information, the quality of 
care may suffer. Therefore, their self–regulation by correcting this 
market failure does nothing more than ensure that the risk is 
reduced. Importantly, the antitrust enforcers and the courts 
would have rejected all the above quality justifications 
irrespective of the way they were structured, either as public 
safety or market failure defenses. This is because none of the 
alleged pro-competitive justifications would have convinced the 
U.S. courts that the challenged restraints to competition were the 
least restrictive ones. 
Why then do the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the courts 
constantly reject public safety claims?  First, because if they took 
patient safety justifications into account this might be translated 
as a sign of distrust in the power of markets to always deliver 
high quality healthcare services. It may also be seen by potential 
cartelists as a sign that in healthcare markets, antitrust 
enforcement is more lenient. More importantly, it may be seen by 
antitrust infringers in other markets as a sign that quality justifies 
restrictions to competition. Therefore, deterrence may be 
weakened. Furthermore, if public safety was considered a 
plausible and cognizable justification, both judges and agencies 
may be more tempted to shape their decisions in line with their 
political preferences and ideologies. If courts and the FTC 
integrated public safety claims in their analysis one additional 
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risk might emerge: medical associations may be more incentivized 
to raise safety claims that mask their self-interest. Additionally, 
accepting patient safety claims as plausible justifications might 
erode price competition and lead to price increases. In light of 
these risks, their narrow approach ensures accountability, 
transparency and enhances price competition. 
What are the cons of this approach? Insisting that the 
competitive process will ultimately protect healthcare quality 
does not necessarily reflect market reality. Arguably, the claim 
that more choice necessarily brings better outcomes sounds more 
like a textbook myth rather than a sound economic principle. 
This is because this simple heuristic claim is based on the 
erroneous presumption that human beings do a remarkably good 
job in making choices or at least a better job than anyone else.311 
Nonetheless, behavioral economics warn that the ways human 
being act do not always and necessarily reflect the predictions of 
rational choice theory.312 
Humans predictably make mistakes.313 For instance, 
although medical research indicates that obesity is linked with an 
increased risk for heart disease and diabetes, frequently causing 
premature death, obesity rates in the United States approximate 
20% and more than 60% of Americans are considered either 
obese or overweight.314 Certainly, this example neither suggests 
nor indicates that humans repeatedly fail to make good choices. 
On the opposite, people choose well “in contexts in which they 
have experience, good information and prompt feedback, such as 
when choosing ice cream flavors.”315 They do less well though in 
cases in which they lack either experience or good information.316 
Why? 
People generally tend to make biased assessments of risks. 
They estimate frequencies or probabilities by asking “how readily 
examples come to mind.” 317 Inevitably, these biased assessments 
of risk adversely affect people’s decision-making process and 
their ability to construct rational choices. As Professors Thaler 
and Sunstein observe, “easily remembered events may inflate 
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people’s probability judgements; and if not such events come to 
mind, their judgements of likelihoods might be distorted 
downwards.”318 Humans are also unrealistically optimistic when 
they exercise choice.319 As they often underestimate the possibility 
of being harmed, they may even decide not to take the necessary 
preventive measures.320 People also suffer from loss aversion 
which is a form of cognitive nudge.321 This may deter humans 
from making changes even when such changes align with their 
interests.322 
Additionally, although generally people appreciate choice, 
“the tendency to search long and hard reduces enjoyment from 
the end result.”323 This is because not all people have the ability to 
adequately assess any type of information. Some people even fail 
to assess fairly simple information.324 In one study, participants 
were presented with decision tasks that mainly involved locating 
information in tables and graphs.325 Surprisingly, the youngest 
participants’, aged 18-35, errors averaged 8% while the oldest 
ones’, aged 85-94, averaged 40% errors.326 
These challenges are magnified especially when people 
have to predict how their choices will affect their lives.327 This is 
because of the ambiguity aversion people exhibit, a notion 
implying that people prefer to make choices in contexts where 
they can more easily predict the outcome rather than in contexts 
in which the end results are much more ambiguous.328 Thus, 
when humans cannot easily translate the choices they make into 
the experiences they may have, they may benefit less from 
numerous choices or from choosing not to choose for 
themselves.329 In these situations, increasing the amount of 
information available to consumers can overwhelm cognitive 
abilities and inevitably lead to choices that do not serve 
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consumers’ interests.330 
Surely, one could argue that choosing a doctor, hospital, or 
treatment is a complicated task since the amount of information a 
patient should actually evaluate in order to make the choice that 
best serves her interests is usually high. For example, choosing 
the appropriate medical treatment involves assessing the 
probabilities of benefit or harm from alternative forms of 
treatment or no treatment at all. And, as noted, experimental 
evidence reveals that individuals face difficulties in making good 
and rational decisions when they are required to weigh 
probabilities. Therefore, to the extent product or service 
characteristics increase in complexity, consumers in general (and 
patients in particular) may be unwilling to invest extensive time 
and energy into assessing all the available choices, comparing 
various levels of prices and quality, and choosing the product or 
service that better meets their needs.331 
Research in behavioral economics further indicates that 
individuals also lack the ability to construct the right choices 
when they are particularly influenced by fears of regret from a 
decision.332 This is because consumers may often overestimate the 
probability of an adverse outcome simply because they are afraid 
that they might regret this decision.333 Therefore, patients that are 
empowered to make autonomous decisions may anticipate greater 
risk from treatment options compared to those whose doctors 
chose for them.334 Indeed, when consumers make more 
autonomous decisions, they tend to opt for more conservative 
treatment options.335 
Patients’ choices regarding medical treatment may not 
necessarily improve their welfare for one additional reason: 
because they are often socially constructed.336 This means that 
when patients face complex health decisions, they often prefer 
relying on their intuition and emotions as well as trusted 
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networks, rather than on objective, reliable information.337 When 
such biases, norms, and heuristics are at stake, there are two 
important implications for antitrust enforcers and policy makers: 
individuals will tend to make judgment errors, and act in ways 
that do not necessarily reflect the presumptions of expected utility 
theory.338 
Moreover, arguing that vigorous competition will 
necessarily improve quality completely disregards medicine’s 
perceptive on how patients’ lives are actually improved. As 
medical professionals spell out, quality of medical treatment also 
depends on non-economic values such as the notions of 
acceptability and trust, essential features of the patient-doctor 
relationship and the therapeutic enterprise. Indeed, the notion of 
trust is crucial in the case of medical treatment, where the stakes 
are as dear as life itself.339 Patients that trust their physicians are 
more likely to seek care in a timely manner, share sensitive 
information and conform to their physicians’ advice.340 All of 
these are extremely important determinants in health outcomes. 
How would the U.S. antitrust enforcers and courts reply to 
this critique? Considering how they apply the state action 
doctrine, a plausible answer might be that to the extent regulation 
exists that exempts a specific activity from the application of 
antitrust, and this activity is actively supervised by the state, the 
appropriate balance is actually reached between the pursuit of 
healthcare quality and vigorous antitrust. If such regulation exists 
and if the conditions of the state action doctrine apply, this 
answer is convincing. If, however, such a regulation does not 
exist and if state Boards give good reasons why specific practices 
create serious risks to healthcare quality and threaten public 
safety, this answer is inadequate. Faithful to the belief that 
markets always ensure quality and that public health and safety 
justifications are extraneous to antitrust analysis, the U.S. courts 
and the FTC would reject such justifications even if reality 
showed that patients’ safety is at risk and therefore medical 
professionals’ intervention seems necessary. 
Arguably, this approach suffers from important 
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drawbacks. Essentially, it disregards the fact that unregulated 
medical markets are pervaded by negative externalities. In this 
light, an individual might decide to receive a low-quality 
treatment rather than no service at all because she does not fully 
internalize the cost of poor service. When, however, poorly-
informed consumers receive poor care, the effects fall beyond 
those who receive medical treatment. As physicians stressed in 
Teladoc, “[r]epercussions of poor care are felt from emergency 
rooms and inner-city clinics to schools and the workplace – not to 
mention on government agencies that may themselves have to 
pay for the bad outcomes.”341 The FTC and the U.S. courts by 
limiting their analysis to the impact of a specific competition 
restriction on the variety of choices consumers in fact enjoy, they 
forget to consider the costs to the overall society these choices 
actually create. Consequently, they end up disregarding that a 
restriction to competition may avoid more deadweight loss than it 
actually creates. 
Moreover, an antitrust policy that relies on the notion that 
more choice necessarily improves healthcare outcomes without 
examining the risks to healthcare quality these choices may in 
reality create, runs the risk of applying in a way that contributes 
to the health disparities between the rich and the poor. Absent 
effective regulation protecting healthcare quality, while the poor 
or the uninsured would end up buying the low cost, low-quality 
or even unsafe services offered by low skilled unqualified 
providers, the rich would buy the more expensive and higher 
quality services offered by high skilled qualified providers. 
Surely, the application of antitrust law in the healthcare sector 
should not aim to reduce the health inequalities between different 
social groups. Nonetheless, this does not imply that its application 
in healthcare markets should also widen them. 
Potential risks to healthcare quality may also disincentive 
consumers from enjoying a specific good or service. This risk is 
not an imaginary one, as North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners clearly demonstrates. In this case, Judge Keenan 
illustrated in her separate statement, that the Board was aware 
that several consumers had received teeth whitening services that 
did not even respect the minimum standards of hygiene. 
Inevitably, some consumers were harmed. Because consumers 
cannot easily assess medical professional’s qualifications or 
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medical treatment’ adequacy and effectiveness, they might not be 
able to fully understand and identify the reason why they 
suffered a specific harm. Therefore, they might decide to stop 
receiving teeth whitening services both from dentists and non-
dentists. Ultimately, non-licensed or incompetent professionals 
would harm the reputation of licensed and high qualified 
professionals. Arguably, this is another form of negative 
externality the FTC’s and the U.S. courts’ analysis clearly 
ignores. 
Additionally, the courts’ and the FTC’s approach with 
regards to health safety claims may lead to contradictions and 
considerable confusion taking into account the Supreme Court’s 
antitrust analysis in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners. As discussed, in this case the Board alleged that 
permitting non-dentists to perform teeth whitening creates risks 
to healthcare quality. The FTC rejected this quality concern on 
the basis that such a justification is not a cognizable one, which 
means one that stems from measures that increase output, 
improve product quality or innovation. Nonetheless, this strict 
view may lead to contradictory outcomes for the following 
reason: one important aspect of product’s or service’s quality is 
safety. In this regard, a competition restrain that may enhance a 
product’s or service’s safety would also improve its quality. 
However, since public safety justifications are not considered 
cognizable, they would be rejected by the FTC and the U.S. 
courts, as extraneous to an antitrust analysis. 
Moreover, an antitrust analysis that clearly disregards 
medical professionals’ views on what health care quality is and 
how it is achieved disregards that medicine “is not only a business 
but also a calling.”342 Doctors’ motivation to protect quality does 
not always and necessarily stem from their self-interest, but also 
by their commitment to altruism, excellence, and public service 
ethos. By considering, however, only economic incentives and by 
disregarding the benefit to the public which occurs from the 
promotion of scientific medicine and the protection of 
professionalism, the FTC and the U.S. courts end up adopting an 
analysis that is one-dimensional.343 
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From health policy perspective though, improvements to 
healthcare quality cannot be achieved if not all functions of a 
health system commit to the quality goals the health system as a 
whole pursues. As Avedis Donabedian, the father of research in 
healthcare quality, insists, “the commitment to quality should 
pervade an institution at all its levels and in all its aspects.”344 
Arguably, medical professionals and antitrust enforcers are 
responsible for protecting quality in different ways. While 
antitrust enforcers aim to promote quality by protecting 
competition, healthcare providers promote quality by ensuring 
that the services they provide meet the highest possible standard 
of care.345 Nonetheless, to them, this goal is better achieved 
through professionalism and less through vigorous competition. 
Since, however, doctors’ commitment to protect quality is highly 
linked with their commitment to professionalism, a health care 
system as well as an antitrust policy that aims to protect quality 
as a whole should not disregard this essential dimension of the 
notion. An antitrust policy that sees doctors mainly as knaves, 
“individuals that are predominantly motivated by self-interest[,]” 
and not as knights,346 “professionals that are predominantly 
public-spirited[,]” might seriously undermine medical 
professionals’ commitment to professionalism and therefore their 
commitment to protect healthcare quality. 
What are the alternatives? The U.S. antitrust enforcers 
and the courts should extend the notion of quality when they 
apply antitrust law in healthcare. In fact, they should adopt a 
definition that echoes the perspectives of both medicine and 
antitrust law; a definition that in fact takes into account that the 
notion of healthcare quality is a multidimensional concept that 
encompasses the goals of safety, acceptability, effectiveness and 
trust in the doctor-patient relationship. This definition would be 
in line with the definition that has been adopted by key players in 
the field of healthcare such as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, the World Health Organization, the 
Institute of Medicine, and Avedis Donabedian.347 
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Would the adoption of this wider definition of healthcare 
quality transform the application of antitrust law in healthcare? 
Surely, the answer is positive. Adopting a wider notion of 
healthcare quality would allow the FTC and the courts to create 
an analytical framework under which conflicting goals between 
antitrust and medicine could in fact be balanced. This is because 
if the U.S. antitrust enforcers adopted a more holistic approach 
when they examine how a specific restriction to competition may 
impact healthcare quality, they would be able to balance different 
components of quality against harm to competition. They would 
be able, for example, to balance safety and effectiveness verses 
choice and competition, acceptability and trust verses choice and 
competition. As Professor Allensworth has observed, “the U.S. 
courts have avoided developing a framework for when 
competition may suppress rivalry for the sake of a more 
functional market.”348 Since the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the 
courts have chosen to define quality as choice, any balancing 
exercise between harm to competition and the multiple facets of 
healthcare quality has become simply unnecessary. Widening, 
however, the values and the dimensions of quality that shape 
their legal analysis and outcomes, would incentivize them to 
provide more accurate guidance on whether and how 
improvements to quality may outweigh harms to competition. 
Undoubtedly, if the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the 
Courts balanced potential harm to competition against the 
protection of quality, the costs of antitrust enforcement may be 
increased. Nonetheless, if antitrust authorities adopted the 
proposed solution, an important goal would be achieved: they 
would apply an antitrust analysis that does not ignore healthcare 
markets’ limits, imperfections, and special facets. They would 
also apply an antitrust analysis that is in line with behavioral 
economics research indicating that human beings in general and 
patients in particular do not necessarily and always make the 
decisions that serve their interests. In other words, they would 
apply an analysis that reflects more healthcare markets realities 
and less textbook myths. They would also apply antitrust law in 
the healthcare sector in a way that does not disregard the 
perspective of medicine on what healthcare quality is and how it 
is achieved. Indeed, adopting this holistic approach would allow 
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different institutions pursuing different goals to respect each 
other’s views and perspectives on what healthcare quality is and 
how it is achieved. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has identified how the FTC and the U.S. 
courts define and assess healthcare quality and how they respond 
to medical associations’ claims that a certain restriction of 
competition is necessary for the protection of healthcare quality. 
In concluding, this article does not aim to claim that the U.S. 
antitrust enforcers and the courts should evaluate healthcare 
quality defenses and justifications in a more lenient way. 
Undoubtedly, a more lenient approach may incentivize medical 
associations to raise quality concerns that may disguise self-
interest. More importantly, it may substantially suppress price 
competition and prohibit citizens from enjoying healthcare 
services that are essential for their well-being and flourishing. It 
has argued, though, that the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the 
courts should adopt a definition of quality that reflects the notion 
that healthcare quality is a multidimensional concept consisting 
of the notions of effectiveness, safety, trust and acceptability. 
Adopting this wider definition would incentivize the antitrust 
enforcers to create an analytical framework under which they 
would be able to balance harm to competition against the 
multiple facets of healthcare quality. Adopting a wider more 
holistic approach to healthcare quality would also allow the U.S. 
antitrust enforcers and the courts to adopt an analysis that 
reflects healthcare markets’ limits and special facets. Expanding 
their approach would also ensure that antitrust enforcers and 
medical associations do not constantly struggle to impose their 
own views on what the prevailing facets of healthcare quality 
should be. In Donabedian’s language, an alternative approach 
would ensure that all functions of the health system commit to 
the quality goals the system as a whole pursues. 
